Political philosophy. by Brooks,  Thom
Hegel’s Political Philosophy 
Thom Brooks 
 
Forthcoming in Michael Bauer (ed.), G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts. Durham: Acumen, 2014. 
 
Introduction 
G. W. F. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is widely considered to be one of the most important 
contributions to the history of political philosophy, but also among the more complex.
1
 This 
chapter explains the central ideas to this ground-breaking work in an accessible approach that 
keeps technical terminology to a minimum. My aim is to clarify the distinctiveness of 
Hegel’s project and illuminate its widely influential discussions about freedom, recognition, 
the individual’s relation to the state and punishment to provide readers with a clear 
understanding of the Philosophy of Right within Hegel’s philosophical system through a close 
reading of this text.
2
 
 
Political Philosophy as Philosophy 
Most key texts in the history of political thought can be appreciated as stand-alone 
contributions. John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government with its promotion of natural 
rights can be understood independently of Locke’s other texts. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is 
very different and made clear from its Preface: ‘This textbook is a more extensive, and in 
particular a more systematic, exposition of the same basic concepts which…are already 
contained in a previous work designed to accompany my lectures, namely, my Encyclopaedia 
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 All references in the text will be to Hegel (1991a). I will provide the section (§) number and where appropriate 
note Remarks (R) and Additions (A) where §112R refers to the Remark of section 112 and §112A refers to that 
section’s Addition. Hegel’s original text had neither Remarks nor Additions. The Remarks were added in a later 
edition of the Philosophy of Right by Hegel. The Additions are comments attributed to Hegel in his lectures by 
one of two students. 
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 Readers interested to pursue further reading are recommended to consider Brooks (2013), Houlgate (2005), 
Knowles (2002) and Wood (1990). 
of the Philosophical Sciences’ (Hegel 1991a: 9). On Hegel’s self-understanding of his 
project, we must interpret his political philosophy within his philosophical system – and this 
is presented in the Encyclopaedia in an outline form. Hegel regularly elaborated other parts 
of his philosophical system in university lectures, including work on art, history, religion and 
the history of philosophy. Hegel reminds us on each occasion that his examination of a 
particular topic is not to be understood independently of the wider philosophical system of 
which each forms a part. For Hegel, political philosophy is not an isolated subject-matter, but 
a part of philosophy writ large (Westphal 1993).  
This systematic nature of his philosophical contributions is difficult to appreciate by 
contemporary standards. Few, if any, philosophers today create and defend philosophical 
systems that attempt to unify logic, nature, ethics and other topics within the kind of 
systematic structure that Hegel provides. Furthermore, it can be more difficult to grasp the 
subtleties of a philosopher where to properly interpret any one part requires a knowledge of 
how it fits within a larger whole. 
The systematic nature of Hegel’s philosophy matters because it underpins how we 
should attempt to reconstruct it. Unlike most other philosophers, the text does not start from 
its own beginning, but it instead takes off from a point within a larger, systematic whole. We 
next turn in the following section to this somewhat unique approach to doing philosophy and 
are reminded of where we find ourselves in the dialectic at each point. While this requires 
careful study to best grasp each step in Hegel’s argument, it is crucial to understanding how 
his project unfolds and its distinctive contributions to political philosophy. We must always 
recall that, for Hegel, thinking about political philosophy concerns our doing philosophy and 
so how it fits within a philosophical structure is crucial.
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 The reader finds constant references by Hegel to his political philosophy as part of a ‘science’ and working 
within a ‘scientific method’ that is ‘presupposed’ from earlier work, such as his Science of Logic. These 
comments refer to the science and scientific method of Hegel’s distinctive philosophical project and its 
foundation on a particular view of logic, not a reliance on any branch of the natural sciences. 
 One final, important note is that Hegel’s way of doing philosophy involves a kind of 
rational reconstruction of the world. Perhaps the most famous passage of the Philosophy of 
Right helps illustrate this well: ‘What is rational is actual; what is actual is rational’ (1991a: 
20). This passage has been misunderstood widely despite Hegel’s efforts to clarify such 
mistakes (1991b: §6R). Hegel is not claiming that what exists is rational. He is instead 
referring to the idea that reason can help us discern the actuality in our reality. For example, 
our world consists of many political states and each might be said to ‘exist’, but each are only 
‘actual’ in Hegel’s understanding to the degree they satisfy certain rational commitments. We 
look to our world to discern its inner rationality where some practices and institutions will be 
found more ‘rational’ (and so more ‘actual’) than others. Two states may exist, but one can be 
more ‘actual’ than the other on account of its rationality. Hegel’s meaning of rationality and 
how this might work will play an important role in the explanation of his political philosophy. 
This is made clear from the first sentence of the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right: ‘The 
subject-matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right – the concept of right 
and its actualization’ (§1). Our central focus is on our understanding of ‘right’ and its 
actualization within Hegel’s philosophical (and to his mind ‘scientific’) system. 
 
Freedom  
Hegel’s political philosophy is first and foremost about freedom. His Philosophy of Right is a 
translation of the word Recht for ‘right’. Recht is open to multiple meanings in German which 
Hegel exploits in his usage. Recht can mean ‘right’ in terms of ‘it is right that all citizens can 
vote in the election’ signifying a moral property: the moral goodness of democratic 
participation by citizens. Or it can mean ‘right’ as ‘it is a right that all citizens can vote in the 
election’ highlighting a legal property: the legal entitlement of citizens to democratic 
decision-making. Hegel’s discussion of ‘right’ can then be understood as both a moral right 
and a legal right where the latter may help ‘actualize’ the former. This is broadly consistent 
within a natural law framework whereby law and morality are seen as connected (Brooks 
2012a). Hegel’s discussion expands on his earlier comments provided in his philosophical 
system published in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences – which offers an 
encyclopaedic coverage of this system – where Hegel originally presented these ideas about 
freedom, the free will and right in outline.
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 Right is understood as ‘the realm of actualized freedom’ where our freedom is 
transformed from merely thinking into something that becomes manifest (§4, 4R). Hegel 
attempts to overcome the particular challenge of determining what he calls ‘the free will 
which wills the free will’ (§27).  The issue is this: if each person possesses a free will, then 
every individual is capable of being free. But how can we know when a free being acts freely 
and not merely arbitrary? We might contrast human freedom with non-human animals. My 
cat and I make various choices throughout the day. Hegel’s point is that my cat makes 
choices, but lacks substantive freedom because it acts in relation to its immediate cravings for 
food and sleep. Human beings alone can enjoy freedom in a more substantive sense because 
we do not merely exercise choice, but possess some mastery over the choices we make. It is 
not so much that I have a choice, but what I choose that is an issue.
5
 The problem then is to 
discern cases of mere arbitrary cravings from exercises of freedom. 
 Hegel argues that freedom springs from the activity of mutual recognition between 
persons. If human beings possess free will, they are capable of freedom. The first point to 
consider is that no one person can be his or her own judge about whether a choice is made 
                                                 
4
 Readers are directed to consider the sections on the free will (Hegel 1971: §§481—82) where Hegel first raises 
the problem of how to know when free human beings makes choices and not arbitrary and which leads him to 
discover (in ‘Objective Spirit’ (Hegel 1971: §§483—551)) how freedom can and should be grounded by mutual 
recognition. Note that the need for mutual recognition discussed in the Philosophy of Right (which expands 
upon Hegel 1971: §§483—551) springs a problem arising in a section immediately before where the Philosophy 
of Right is placed. To understand where we should begin, we must consider where in the philosophical system 
we are. 
5
 This perspective is consistent with a ‘positive’ view of freedom where it is understood as a positive capacity to 
do or be in certain ways (Green 1993). 
freely or not. This is because such judgements would be no less arbitrary. Hegel argues that if 
we take seriously the need to determine the boundaries of freedom then it is essential we find 
a more secure basis for making such judgements. He claims that the free will must be 
grounded in the will of another (§75), but what does this mean and how does it work? 
 Hegel illustrates this important idea about mutual recognition in his discussion of 
Property that immediately follows the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right. A regular 
mistake is to think that he is considering rights to property as such rather than as a mere 
illustration about how we can determine the contours of human freedom. This is despite his 
early caution that his discussion about property concerns how it ‘may constitute the sphere of 
its freedom’ and that ‘the rational aspect of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of 
needs but in the superseding of mere subjectivity of personality’ (§41, §41A). The rationality 
of property is not its satisfying our immediate cravings because then it looks like a mere 
animal want, but instead ‘superseding’ our ‘mere subjectivity’ – property is instrumental to 
discovering how we can improve a mere subjective judgement about freedom. 
 Property is important for Hegel because it can express some aspect of who we are 
through our choices. Our property is ours and constitutes some significance as such. Consider 
how the belongings we possess can express something about what we value within our 
available means. Hegel uses colourful language to express this idea – that we give our 
possessions ‘a soul other than that which it previously had; I give it my soul’ (§44A). But, 
again, this ‘soul’ I confer on my objects is my individual stamp whereby I demarcate things 
as ‘mine’ and part of my individuality (§59). The importance of my property for me is 
understood in terms of the values I assign them. So a thing’s value is a part of the exercise of 
my freedom and expression about how I choose to assign importance (§63). Nonetheless, the 
existence of a thing’s value is weak and limited to my own subjective tastes. We are unable to 
confirm whether such a choice is purely arbitrary or connected to my freedom. 
 Freedom is only possible through mutual recognition with another person. It is 
through someone else’s recognition of a thing as mine that its existence becomes more 
‘actual’ and determinate (§§71, 75).  My judgements about objects as my property and the 
value I assign to them lose their purely subjective character when confirmed by another 
person. Mutual recognition makes possible objective judgement. Consider that my cat is more 
mine when not only I claim my cat as mine, but this is confirmed by others. Or that my car as 
mine is no longer a statement about personal taste or aspiration, but becomes more determine 
and more certain as others find agreement with me that my car is possessed by me. Hegel’s 
point is not that we must always agree, but rather that agreement by persons through mutual 
recognition is a process by which free human beings interact with each other as free and 
through which our freedom can be understood and made more concrete. Note that wide 
agreement does not make something so as it can be based on error, but essential disagreement 
is a barrier to any concept of right becoming ‘actual’. For Hegel, that which is most right may 
be actual in its rationality, but not actual as real and having its existence in the world – it 
remains an ideal or perhaps a mere dream. This connection between freedom and mutual 
recognition underpins the arguments that follow about how freedom in a just state should be 
conceived and upheld. 
We have seen that the section about Property concerns our values, possession and 
rights, but it is focussed on the development of a conception about human freedom rather 
than any importance of property to satisfy our immediate needs. So Hegel’s discussion about 
property addresses some common themes found in alternative theories of property while 
taking a generally unique perspective that provides a new understanding of property and its 
importance that can be easy to overlook. 
 
Crime and Punishment 
Hegel’s discussion about punishment – which follows Property – works similarly. He will 
discuss ideas about wrongs and how they should be addressed using language reminiscent of 
what we might find in penal theory, but its perspective is distinctive and very different from 
other such work. 
 Hegel’s analysis focusses on the concept of ‘Wrong’ [das Unrecht], the absence of 
right. Wrongs come in three categories. The first is the unintentional wrong. This is where we 
have ‘collisions of rights’ between contesting parties because of a disagreement based on a 
mistake (§84). If mutual recognition is required for the possibility of more objective 
judgements about freedom, then agreement can have real importance where relevant for 
helping us determine the contours of our freedom. This does not require we always agree or 
should endeavour towards agreement. But where we disagree because of some mistake, this 
is thought to be the least kind of wrong we do to others because all parties are engaged with 
each other on similar terms (§85). 
 Deception is the second category and a worse kind of wrong. This is because both 
parties appeal to a similar ground while one misleads the other. Deception is not a mistake 
about what should be right, but instead claiming a shared commitment that is insincere. Hegel 
argues that there should be no penalty attached to cases where people engage in unintentional 
wrongs, but not so for deceptions (§88A). 
 Crime is the third and final category of wrong and the worst of them all. We must pay 
careful attention to the fact that what Hegel is calling ‘Crime’ is distinct from the criminal 
law. Crime is not a mistaken judgement or a deception because these other categories make 
some appeal to the common right shared by all through mutual recognition. Mutual 
recognition based on a mistake is easily rectified and mutual recognition through deception is 
at least an engagement with others through mutual recognition. Crime is an essential 
breakdown of connections where the possibility of mutual recognition is denied others. Hegel 
says that crime is a denial of right because it fails to engage in any mutual recognition with 
others (§95). So crime is not a mere disagreement, but rather a full disengagement. This is 
then a source for major problems: if we disengaged with others, then mutual recognition 
would not occur and so we would be unable to determine the development of our freedom – 
free institutions would become impossible and, indeed, the existence of our free individuality. 
 But what exactly is a ‘crime’? Hegel refers to the failure of individuals to honour 
contractual stipulations where one party refuses to satisfy the terms agreed between private 
individuals. This requires a ‘restoration of right’ whereby this refusal to accept what has been 
agreed is corrected so that mutual recognition is restored and with it the possibility of 
freedom and its actualization as ‘right’ (§99).  
Crime is not the criminal law. Note that Hegel’s discussion considers only two 
persons interacting with each other and abstracted from their wider social and political 
context – this helps explain why Hegel’s discussion about ‘right’ concerning property, mutual 
recognition and wrong falls within a sphere he labels ‘Abstract Right’ to highlight its partial, 
non-contextual and abstract character. Abstract Right is a sphere of individual interaction of 
two persons. It is not a place with a legal system, police force, judiciary, a state or prisons. 
Much of Hegel’s discussion is purely theoretical although he makes clear that crimes in the 
legal perspective will build off the essential nature of crime as a failure of recognition that 
requires some form of restoration. So theft is understood as a failure of someone to recognize 
the property rights of others or murder is a failure to recognize the right of another to his life. 
The essential point is we must remember our place in the overall philosophical system – 
within this systematic reading and understanding of Hegel’s argument – and recall that Hegel 
may use some familiar terms like crime and punishment concerning wrongs, but he 
understands them differently from our usual uses here (Brooks 2001, Brooks 2004, Brooks 
2012b, Brooks 2013: chapter 3). 
 Morality 
Hegel believes that our reflections about mutual recognition lead us to move to a new sphere 
for consideration. ‘Abstract Right’ ends with the acknowledgement that there is a problem 
where persons refuse to honour terms agreed through mutual recognition given the central 
importance mutual recognition has for providing us with a process to make more determinate 
judgements about our freedom. The problem this discussion has is that we have not yet 
considered ‘the moral point of view’ of the individuals concerned (§105). In Abstract Right, 
it does not matter what specifically our principle or intention was – what mattered was that an 
intention is present, such as the intention to recognize one another as free persons (§106A). 
Hegel’s morality – or ‘the moral point of view’ – is an attempt to look within at our 
subjective morality to clarify the ways in which we can and should act as free and responsible 
human beings from which to build a more objective picture (§§107, 108). 
 Yet again – and we should no longer find this surprising – Hegel discusses a topic 
using familiar terms in unfamiliar ways. Moral philosophy is the stuff of ‘purpose and 
responsibility’ (§§115—18), ‘intention and welfare’ (§§119—28) and ‘the good and the 
conscience’ (§§129—41). Hegel notes that to free persons should be only accountable for 
actions for which they have responsibility (§117). Free persons should accept responsibility 
for consequences flowing from their choices (or omissions) as expressions of their intentions 
(§118). This discussion brings out what Hegel calls ‘the right of subjective freedom’ 
understood as a right to express one’s inner will through their actions, such as a choice of 
occupation (§§124, 124R). We can only be free through our intentions and actions that are 
freely chosen. One more basic way this could be achieved is through our possession and uses 
of property seen in Abstract Right. Another, more substantial and yet elusive way is through 
our intentions and purposes more generally. 
 Hegel’s discussion about morality rests on an unusual view about what morality is 
about. This is brought out well in his famous critique of Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy. 
Hegel claims that Kantian ethics is little more than ‘an empty formalism’ that rests on ‘an 
empty rhetoric of duty for duty’s sake’ (§135R). Much has been said about this passage and 
nearly all overlooks Hegel’s central criticism. So commentators regularly focus on Hegel’s 
concern that the Kantian categorical imperative that each person should ‘act that the maxim 
of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving of universal law’ 
determines morality through a formula without regard to its content (Kant 1997). Therefore, 
murder is immoral because we cannot all murder each other as once and so it is not an action 
we could perform at one time. One part of Hegel’s concern is murder is wrong not because it 
is merely inconsistent with universal actions, but because it is wrong. Note that Hegel is 
critiquing Kant on Hegelian terms, such as the idea that wrong is rooted in a failure to engage 
in mutual recognition and denial of rights to others. Kant gets things incorrect because he 
understands wrongs in a different way. 
 A more general and central problem of Kantian ethics is that it is ‘the merely moral 
point of view’ (§135R). Its problem is that it is moral philosophy. Now this may seem like an 
odd problem, but again consider how Hegel uses familiar terms in unfamiliar ways. Moral 
philosophy for most philosophers today is about reflecting on normative considerations 
relating to the world. Few, if any, moral philosophers would agree that moral philosophy is 
utterly disconnected with the world as we find it. 
 But this is Hegel’s distinctive view about what moral philosophy is about. Morality is 
an abstraction into oneself and considering our relations to others in abstract, non-contextual 
and beyond a connection with institutions. Moral philosophy is what we do thinking about 
ourselves while sitting in an armchair. Normative reflection about our relations to others in 
context is a different project altogether – what many might call applied ethics or political 
philosophy, Hegel calls Ethical Life. Essentially, the problem of Kantian ethics is not merely 
that it is formulistic, but that it is a moral philosophy from which Kant develops a political 
philosophy.
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In other words, the reason why moral philosophy is limited and incapable of full 
application to the real world is because that’s simply not how Hegel understands it. First we 
reflect on how we can locate a more secure basis for determining whether our actions are free 
or arbitrary. We think about ourselves in Abstract Right in abstract terms and removed from 
our social and political context. We consider our relations to others as one and another to 
discover the importance of mutual recognition and how it might work. We next consider 
ourselves as individuals in relation to others, but again in abstract terms without reflection 
about our concrete situations. The purpose of Morality is to clarify our self-understanding as 
purposeful and responsible persons. Hegel believes these steps are required prior to our 
starting an examination of ourselves in our concrete reality, as members of Family working in 
Civil Society within the political State. This third and final sphere of Family, Civil Society 
and the State is provided in what Hegel calls ‘Ethical Life’ and to which I will now turn. 
 
The Family 
Ethical Life is the sphere where we realize ‘the Idea of freedom as a living good’ (§142). It is 
a higher sphere of freedom because only here do we consider ourselves not in abstract, but in 
within our concrete reality. The first instance of this concrete reality, for Hegel, is the Family. 
The Family is conceived as a traditional union of a man and woman with children. The claim 
is that together they represent a higher, more developed scenario of mutual recognition where 
each recognizes each other as not merely persons but as members of a family with associated 
obligations to each other. 
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 See also Brooks (2013: 82—95) and for discussion on this see Wood (2012: 20). 
 One way the family is a special kind of mutual recognition is its foundation in 
marriage. This is not a mere agreement about contractual stipulations over possessions, but a 
shared ‘union’ based on love where each identifies with one another through an act of free 
choice recognized by the other (§§161, 162). Unfortunately, it is essential that the family is 
composed of a man and woman at its heart. One reason for this is because Hegel saw men 
and women as possessing essential differences which complemented each other (§§166, 
166A). A same-sex couple would fail to obtain the same goods that come from building on 
different strengths available to heterosexual couples.  
 A second reason is that Hegel views the family as a natural representation of logical 
development (§§168A). For Hegel, logic develops through the creativity unity arising from 
difference. It is then unsurprising, for Hegel, that persons with essential differences like men 
and women can conceive children (§173A). 
 Neither of these reasons are compelling although note that Hegel is arguing for a 
traditional view of the family on non-traditional grounds. The traditional family is ‘the ideal’ 
not because of any particular religious or cultural doctrine, but as a creative unity of 
difference giving life to the Hegelian dialectic and as a (literally) marrying up of 
complementary opposites. It is also well worth noting that Hegel did not himself enjoy a 
traditional family – and so he is not attempting to justify a particular conception of the family 
that he possessed. 
 A key element of Hegel’s perspective is that in the Family our understanding of 
mutual recognition is crystallized. Here we engage in mutual recognition within a specific 
context of our shared affection pursuing familial support through our essential determinations 
as husband, wife and child and where mutual recognition requires a system of mutual support 
focused on the upbringing of children. 
 
Civil Society 
Civil Society is a sphere of work and associational life beyond the family (and, unfortunately, 
the sole province of men). It is conceived as a further development of mutual recognition 
beyond the family unit. Whereas members of a family are united in a bond of affection, 
members of civil society are connected in a bond of common purposes.  
 Civil society comprises a world where individuals engage each other as individuals – 
not as members of their families, but as members of some trade or activity sharing the same 
employment or working in a civil service, like the police. Each is driven to work in civil 
society because of ‘subjective need’, the desire to provide for each person’s family (§189). 
Hegel accepts the idea of a market economy and says that through it a division of labour is 
created and this is welcome because it permits individuals to pursue their subjective freedom 
in a new way (§198). Likewise, each satisfies the wants of others through the pursuit of his 
work (§199). 
 Hegel argues for three different classes of workers, or what he calls ‘estates’. The first 
– the ‘substantial estate’ – are the farmers who depend on the cultivation of their soil for their 
livelihood (§203).  The second is the ‘estate of trade and industry’ which includes mass 
production, craftsmen and finance (§204). Whereas the first estate finds itself dependent on 
its land, the second estate is dependent on itself – and so closer to ‘freedom’ than the first 
(§204A). The third estate is ‘the universal estate’ of the civil service (§205). Their livelihood 
is earned by the support of all as they work for everyone’s benefit: their ‘private interest is 
satisfied through working for the universal’ (§205). 
 Hegel’s discussion of civil society includes an illuminating discussion of law and 
society where he begins to revisit earlier topics, such as crime and punishment. He argues 
that the ‘objective actuality of right’ consists in its being ‘universally valid’ (§210). Our 
rights are deficient in their objective actuality where they fail to command the mutual 
agreement of others. The legal system is one important effort to clarify and make more 
determinate a system of rights. Rather than private agreement about what we are each free or 
unfree to do, the law is an attempt to specify the appropriate conditions to guide our practices 
(§211). One result is Hegel endorses codification rather than a common law as a better means 
of specifying what these conditions whereas the common law leaves this more open. Hegel 
also recognizes that there may be an important normative space between what the law claims 
as right from what is right – a distinction highlighted at the beginning of this chapter. The 
law is an attempt to specify our shared and so more objective (and less subjective) view about 
right and it is a project requiring constant revision as we try to bring our ideals into actual 
existence.
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 Nowhere is this give-and-take more apparent than our understanding of crime and 
punishment. Hegel now considers ‘crime’ in a more familiar sense as part of a criminal law. 
He recognizes that crimes are failures of mutual recognition, but what is understood to be 
such a failure is contextual and shifts over time. Witchcraft and wizardry were once serious 
crimes because of a perception about their intrinsic wrongness which is no longer widely 
shared and so removed from the criminal law. This perception about wrongness informs not 
only criminalization, but sentencing and it is influenced by the self-certainty of a community. 
Witchcraft and wizardry are no longer perceived to be the grave threats to society they once 
were and this, for Hegel, might be an explanation for why they no longer require punishment 
(§218). So what a crime is in its abstract character is relatively timeless, but those acts 
constituting crimes is given to change over time and so too the relation between crime and 
punishment can change (§218R). 
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 This is another interesting example of this understanding of less subjective as more objective where objectivity 
is not all-or-nothing, but comes in degrees. 
 Hegel argues that we determine punishment’s severity in relation to a crime’s 
perceived ‘danger to civil society’ (§218R).8 The more the public is threatened by a crime, 
the more severe the punishment. One consequence is that perceptions and contexts matter: ‘a 
penal code is therefore primarily a product of its time and of the current condition of civil 
society’ (§218R). For example, if society was engaged in riots or war, then otherwise minor 
crimes take on a more threatening character and so can demand more serious punishment: ‘in 
times of war…various things which are otherwise harmless must be regarded as harmful’ 
(§234A). A result is that there is never one punishment alone forever ‘just’ for any one crime, 
but the relation will change as the contextual climate changes (§218A). 
 Hegel includes a famous discussion about the problem of poverty. This is the problem 
where a market economy will necessarily leave some below a level of subsistence (§244). It 
is often commented that Hegel has no good solution to this problem. For example, he 
recommends the unsatisfactory goal of encouraging colonisation (§248). What is 
philosophically interesting in his account is that the root of the problem of poverty is not that 
persons might lack sufficient wealth, but rather that they lack self-respect and a sense that 
they have a stake in society.
9
 Poverty and this sense of political alienation can often go hand-
in-hand although need not and may also encompass the very wealthy. Hegel’s point is that 
those without sufficient means (or those with great riches) may fall into the danger of 
viewing society as an other – a place where other people make rules and determine outcomes 
that appear imposed on me where my views, my projects, my individuality is not accounted 
for. Perhaps there is no ready solution to this. But it highlights one instance where Hegel’s 
illuminating perspectives can both reveal some positive insights into our relation to others, 
but also fundamental problems concerning the fundamental importance of mutual 
recognition. A society where persons felt others will not and even cannot recognize them as 
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 On stakeholding and the idea of a stakeholder society, see Brooks (2012c). 
citizens denies justice to all its members. For Hegel, this is an injustice, but perhaps 
inevitable and even in an ideal conception of the state. 
 
The State 
Hegel concludes the Philosophy of Right with a discussion of the state and its relation to 
others in international affairs. Membership in the state is our ‘highest duty’, in part, because it 
helps make so much possible (§258). Our family is a sphere of natural love and civil society 
is like a family away from home, but the state is different kind of ethical unity where citizens 
have the love of country expressed as patriotism (§268). The state and its constitutional 
structure ‘is the actuality of concrete freedom’ where our earliest, abstract ideas about 
freedom are developed and presented in their most concrete lights (§260). 
 Hegel’s state is controversial. He claims the estates composed of agrarian farmers and 
trade workers provide a check on the powers of the monarch and constitute a form of 
representation. For Hegel, representation based on geographical location is purely arbitrary. 
Instead, each person should be represented through his work in civil society – and since only 
men engage in work in civil society only men are represented in this way in Hegel’s state. 
Selecting representatives from within our spheres of work allows representation to blossom 
from our subjective freedom expressed through our choice of livelihoods. Plus, it permits the 
state as a decision-making body to benefit from a wide-array of interests and expertise 
(§273). 
 The state is headed by a constitutional monarchy (§273R, Brooks 2007). Hegel’s 
reasons for this is that the state requires someone to provide unity. For example, who is to say 
when ‘the state’ confirms a law as its law? This, for Hegel, is answered by ‘the king’ who 
signs bills into law. The monarch is hereditary because this permits him to provide the unity 
required. If he were elected, then he would represent the interests of his supporters and 
perhaps not be seen as a source of unity by those who voted for someone else. So it is 
essential the monarchy is hereditary and unelected. The monarch works with the universal 
estate of bureaucrats and selects suitably qualified persons to serve in cabinet roles and 
advice the king on legislation and international treaties. 
 One interesting aspect of Hegel’s discussion of the state is what he attempts to 
achieve. He argues that traditionally philosophers have debated preferences for aristocracy, 
monarchy and democracy. Hegel’s approach is fascinating because he regularly tries to bring 
opposing views together in new and interesting ways. He argues that his model of the state 
has a natural aristocracy that inherits its position (the agrarian estate), a democratic element 
(the estate of trade workers who elect representatives) and monarchy (the constitutional 
monarch). So we need not choose which is best, but the three fit together best in a particular 
way. 
 
Conclusion 
Hegel’s political philosophy is highly influential and unique. He develops a political 
philosophy from within a larger, distinctive philosophical system that understands familiar 
political concepts in unfamiliar ways. This brief chapter cannot do full justice to the full 
range of ideas and arguments presented and defended in his major contribution to this field, 
the Philosophy of Right. However, I hope that the reader will now gain sufficient insight into 
the problems that Hegel was attempting to solve and how his political philosophy develops as 
a view about how our freedom could become more concrete and actual. While Hegel’s 
political thought is highly complex, it rewards in equal measure to its study. 
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